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TAKING TORT LAW SERIOUSLY IN THE 
ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Anthony J. Sebok* 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF TOO MUCH LAW 
urrent legal argument over the application of the Alien Tort Stat-
ute (“ATS”) presents an interesting irony. While one might have 
thought that the problem with ATS litigation—especially in cutting-edge 
areas such as corporate liability for aiding and abetting—is that there is 
no law at all and that courts are “making things up” as they go along,1 a 
moment’s reflection on the plaintiff’s arguments in Corrie v. Caterpillar, 
recently decided by the Ninth Circuit, illustrates that in fact, when it 
comes to aiding and abetting, there seems to be too much law.2 
In Corrie, the plaintiff’s estate alleged that Caterpillar should be held 
liable under the ATS because Caterpillar violated the law of nations by 
selling modified bulldozers to the Israeli Defense Forces, who planned to 
use the bulldozers to violate certain rights protected by customary inter-
national law.3 The specific claim against Caterpillar was that it was liable 
under the ATS because it had aided and abetted the Israeli Defense 
Forces.4 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the suit 
on political questions ground,5 rendering the legal validity of the underly-
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank 
Dean Joan G. Wexler and the directors of the Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of 
International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School for supporting the conference that 
produced the original version of this Article. Research assistance was provided by Mi-
chael Rudnick, Cardozo 2010. I also would like to thank participants in faculty work-
shops at Cardozo Law School, Temple Law School, and the University of California 
Hastings College of Law, as well as Bill Dodge, David Carlson, Myriam Gilles, Chimène 
I. Keitner, Monica Hakimi, and Anita Ramasastry for comments on subsequent versions 
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 1. This is my phrase, although I think it captures the spirit of the “conservative” 
critique of modern ATS adjudication. See Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 815, 855 (1997) (noting that the customary international law by necessity 
has a “‘soft, indeterminate character,’” and that “it makes no sense to say that judges 
‘discover’ an objectively identifiable” law) (citations omitted). See also Julian Ku, Keep-
ing the Courthouse Door Open for International Law Claims Against Corporations: Re-
thinking Sosa,” 9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 81, 82 (2008) (agreeing 
with Justice Scalia’s prediction that judges would continue to engage in “unbridled fed-
eral court lawmaking”). 
 2. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 3. Id. at 977. 
 4. Id. at 979. 
 5. Id. at 984. 
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ing human rights claim moot, unless the Ninth Circuit takes up the ques-
tion en banc or the case is appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. For pur-
poses of this Article, that question is likewise moot; I want to simply 
note that the plaintiff’s argument about Caterpillar’s aiding and abetting 
liability illustrates the too-much-law irony that is at the heart of contem-
porary ATS litigation against corporations. 
Caterpillar argued two reasons why it could not be held liable for aid-
ing and abetting under the ATS even if the Israeli Defense Forces had 
used Caterpillar’s bulldozers to violate the law of nations. First, citing 
United States v. Blankenship,6 Caterpillar argued that a mere seller of a 
product can never be held liable for the wrongs committed by the buyer 
under aiding and abetting liability.7 Second, citing Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,8 Caterpillar argued that the specific action they allegedly and 
admittedly performed—selling a legal product to Israel—did not consti-
tute a violation of a “specific, universal, and obligatory” proscription as 
required by the Supreme Court’s test for a cause of action under the ATS 
(even if Israel had used the product to violate international law).9 The 
district court accepted these arguments and granted judgment in favor of 
Caterpillar.10 
On appeal, the plaintiffs, not surprisingly, challenged these and other 
arguments made by Caterpillar. The plaintiff advanced a three-part ar-
gument that the aiding and abetting suit meets the Sosa test. First, the 
plaintiff argued that Sosa does not require that an allegation of aiding and 
abetting be rooted in a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm in in-
ternational law.11 In other words, aiding and abetting liability is not a rule 
of international law, but a remedial rule based in federal common law. 
To satisfy the Sosa test, all that needs to be established is that a violation 
of the law of nations may have occurred.12 Once the underlying violation 
is sufficiently alleged, derivative liability follows as a matter of domestic 
                                                                                                             
 6. United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 7. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027 (D. Wash. 2005), va-
cated, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 9. See Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Caterpillar Inc. Pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim and Pursuant to the Political Ques-
tion and Act of State Doctrines at 12–15, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 
(D. Wash. 2005). 
 10. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1026–27 (D. Wash. 2005), va-
cated, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 11. Appellants’ Opening Brief, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 05-36210, at 21–22 
(9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2006). 
 12. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698–99, 724. 
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tort law for anyone who aided and abetted that underlying violation.13 
Second, the plaintiff argued that even if the first argument fails, aiding 
and abetting is recognized under international law.14 That is, selling in-
dustrial products15 or providing a list of names to facilitate their sale16 
satisfies the Sosa test with regards to aiding and abetting the violations of 
international law alleged in the suit—war crimes, extrajudicial killing, 
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. Third, the 
plaintiff argued that the district court used an erroneous definition of aid-
ing and abetting, and that the right definition would support the plain-
tiff’s claim that a jury could find liability.17 While the district court did 
not define aiding and abetting, it cited Blankenship for the proposition 
that, even assuming arguendo that the ATS provided for aiding and abet-
ting liability at all, a mere seller could not be an aider and abettor under 
the ATS.18 The plaintiffs argued instead that under either international 
law or domestic law, a seller could be held liable for aiding and abetting 
if it could be shown that, by selling a product, an actor provided “practi-
cal assistance that has substantial effect on the perpetuation of a crime” 
under international law, or “substantial assistance” under domestic law.19 
This Article examines this irony of too much law in the imposition of 
aiding and abetting liability. Part I looks at aiding and abetting liability 
under both U.S. domestic law, illustrated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts and subsequent case law, and customary international law, derived 
from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Stat-
ute”) and decisions rendered by special international tribunals. Part II 
then explores how this proliferation of sources of law has given jurists a 
wide variety of law from which to choose. After reviewing the current 
case law, this Part examines paradigmatic examples of this irony of too 
much law. This Article concludes that the source of law should be trans-
national (as opposed to domestic) common law tort. 
A review of recent case law underscores the irony of too much law 
even further. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit agreed in Doe I v. Unocal20 that 
                                                                                                             
 13. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25. 
 14. Appellants’ Opening Brief, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., supra note 11, at 23–25. 
 15. See, e.g., In re Tesch (Zyklon B Case), 13 I.L.R. 250 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946). 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen Case), in 4 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 3 (1950). 
 17. Appellants’ Opening Brief, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., supra note 11, at 25–29. 
 18. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027 (D. Wash. 2005), vacated, 
503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 19. Appellants’ Opening Brief, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., supra note 11, at 23–25. 
 20. Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated en banc, 395 F.3d 978 
(9th Cir. 2003). Although the Ninth Circuit was vacated en banc, it led to an important 
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the plaintiff could bring an aiding and abetting claim but disagreed over 
the definition and source of the law of aiding and abetting.21 Given that 
the decision was pre-Sosa, the first argument raised by the Corrie plain-
tiff—that the an allegation of aiding and abetting need not be rooted in a 
“specific, universal, and obligatory” norm in international law—was as-
sumed and not argued. However, the second and third issues were raised, 
and the court’s answers did not follow in any predictable pattern. The 
majority, led by Judge Pregerson, found that the source of aiding and 
abetting law is international law, and that an actor is liable when he pro-
vides “knowing practical assistance” to a party who commits a crime in 
violation of international law.22 The concurrence, written by Judge Rein-
hardt, located the exact same cause of action in domestic law.23 
The friendly disagreement between these two nominally liberal judges 
went even further. Judge Pregerson took the position that, if domestic 
law provided the relevant test, it would be drawn from the doctrine of 
aiding and abetting as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
876.24 In contrast, Judge Reinhardt took the view that a test based on 
domestic law should draw upon the doctrines of joint venture liability,25 
agency liability,26 and reckless disregard27—three common law doctrines 
that are very different from the concept of aiding and abetting. 
A similar dispute over the relevant sources of law arose between two 
judges who otherwise agreed with the basic proposition that aiding and 
abetting liability should be available under the ATS. In Khulumani v. 
                                                                                                             
settlement and remains one of the most learned discussions of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity under the ATS. 
 21. Id. at 947–51. 
 22. Id. at 951. 
 23. Id. at 963–78 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Reinhardt explained: 
In my view, courts should not substitute international law principles for estab-
lished federal common law or other domestic law principles, as the majority 
does here, unless a statute mandates that substitution, or other exceptional cir-
cumstances exist. . . . [T]he benefits of the vast experience embodied in federal 
common law as well as any useful international law principles are obtained 
when we employ the traditional common law approach ordinarily followed by 
federal courts. Those benefits are lost, however, when we substitute for the 
wide body of federal authority and reasoning, as the majority does here, an un-
developed principle of international law promulgated by a recently-constituted 
ad hoc international tribunal. 
Id. at 966–67. 
 24. Id. at 951. 
 25. Id. at 970–72. 
 26. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 972–74. 
 27. Id. at 974–76. 
2008] TAKING TORT LAW SERIOUSLY 875 
Barclay National Bank,28 the South African ATS case recently decided 
by the Second Circuit, the two-judge majority split along exactly the 
same lines as Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt in Unocal. Judge Katz-
mann took the position that the plaintiff’s claim for aiding and abetting 
should adopt the test set out in international law—most significantly, the 
Rome Statute29—while Judge Hall took the position that the plaintiffs’ 
case could go forward on the basis of domestic law—namely the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 876.30 
As the third judge on the panel, Judge Korman, slyly noted in his dis-
sent, if on remand the federal district court were to apply the Rome Stat-
ute, the plaintiffs would likely fail to meet its comparatively demanding 
standard.31 None of the pleadings so far indicates that the defendants 
purposely facilitated the violation of human rights by promoting the 
apartheid system. Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that at most the corporate 
defendants were substantially certain that their efforts to sell products to 
the South African government would have the effect of enabling apart-
heid to survive.32 However, substantial certainty, while meeting the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts test, is insufficient under the Rome Statute’s 
test. 
There is good reason to believe that the judges in Khulumani misun-
derstood the significance of the difference between international and 
domestic law tests for aiding and abetting. While Judge Katzmann stated 
that “those who assist in the commission of a crime with the purpose of 
facilitating that crime would be subject to aiding and abetting liability 
under the statutes governing the [International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia] and the [International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da],” 33 this does not tell the whole story. As the next section will show, 
the applicability of the aiding and abetting doctrine to many corporate 
defendants in ATS litigation is overdetermined. That is, under either 
body of law, the corporate defendants could be found liable. 
                                                                                                             
 28. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curium), aff’d 
due to lack of a quorum sub nom., American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 2008 WL 
117862, 76 U.S.L.W. 3405 (May 12, 2008) (No. 07-919). 
 29. Id. at 274–76. 
 30. Id. at 284–87. 
 31. Id. at 332–33. 
 32. Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint ¶¶ 4–6, In re S. African Apartheid 
Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 33. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276. 
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTENT OF AIDING AND 
ABETTING LIABILITY 
A. The Restatement (Second) of Torts and Halberstam: The Underpin-
nings of Domestic Law 
Although the concept of assigning liability to those who enable or en-
courage tortious conduct has existed within the common law for centu-
ries,34 claims specifically in aiding and abetting have become increas-
ingly common over the last two decades. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 876 was codified in 1979 and allowed for the imposition of li-
ability on persons acting in concert.35 Section 876 attaches liability to an 
actor who knows that another’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty but 
nevertheless provides substantial assistance or encouragement to that 
party.36 
The scope of this doctrine was discussed thoroughly by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Halberstam v. Welch.37 The court in Halberstam noted that rela-
tively few claims had been adjudicated under the theory of aiding and 
abetting, and posited that this phenomenon resulted from confusion in 
applying the doctrine.38 To address the issue, the court analyzed a variety 
of aiding and abetting cases, element by element, to illustrate how the 
tort was correctly applied.39 In particular, the court determined what con-
stituted “substantial assistance” by balancing the five factors recom-
mended in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876: (1) the nature of the 
act encouraged; (2) the amount (and kind) of assistance given; (3) the 
defendant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort; (4) the defen-
dant’s relation to the tortuous actor; and (5) the defendant’s state of 
mind.40 
The court in Halberstam applied these factors to hold a woman liable 
for a murder her husband committed while burglarizing a home.41 Spe-
cifically, the D.C. Circuit ruled that a defendant did not need to be pre-
sent at the time of the tort in order for liability to attach and explained its 
                                                                                                             
 34. See, e.g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795) (holding defendant liable 
for aiding and abetting in piracy because he knowingly supplied guns). See also Hen-
field’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (court recognized liability for 
committing aiding or abetting hostilities in violation of the law of nations). 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1976). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 38. Id. at 478. 
 39. Id. at 478–86. 
 40. Id. at 478. 
 41. Id. at 488–89. 
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ruling through the existence of other relevant factors from section 876.42 
Namely, the district court had found that the defendant knew of her hus-
band’s occupation as a professional thief and was also aware of her own 
role in assisting their criminal enterprise.43 Analogizing the case to an 
illustration in the comments to section 876,44 the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that the plaintiff’s death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
continued personal property crime, and thus found the defendant liable 
for aiding and abetting the murder.45 
Although Halberstam and section 876 have been widely followed,46 
some courts have hesitated to apply the doctrine in difficult cases, and 
others still have not accepted its formulation. For example, in Rice v. 
Paladin Enterprises,47 an aiding and abetting action was brought against 
the publisher of a “hit man” manual after a professional killer relied on 
the book’s approach to carry out a murder.48 The publisher conceded that 
when marketing the book, he intended to help criminals commit crimes.49 
A Maryland district court in the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that state 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. at 486–88. 
 43. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488. These findings were based upon circumstantial 
evidence, and took into account that the defendant acted as her husband’s bookkeeper and 
secretary for many years and also helped launder the items he had stolen. Id. 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d, illus. 10 (1976). The illustra-
tion explains: 
A and B conspire to burglarize C’s safe. B, who is the active burglar, after en-
tering the house and without A’s knowledge of his intention to do so, burns the 
house in order to conceal the burglary. A is subject to liability to C, not only for 
the conversion of the contents of the safe, but also for the destruction of the 
house. 
Id. See also Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (Kan. 1968). 
 45. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483. 
 46. Halberstam has been followed in over 50 subsequent decisions and is accepted as 
good law in many federal circuits. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 288 (“In the almost quar-
ter-century since Halberstam was decided, many state courts and Circuit Courts, includ-
ing the Second Circuit, have adopted the Restatement’s aiding and abetting standard.”). 
See also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (Halberstam 
and the Restatement were followed in the Third Circuit); Temporomandibular Joint 
(TMJ) Implant Recipients v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 1484 (8th Cir. 1997) (followed 
by Eighth Circuit); Kitson v. Bank of Edwardsville, 240 F.R.D. 610 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (fol-
lowed in Seventh Circuit); Davis v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 79, 92 (D. Mass. 
2004); Crawford By & Through Crawford v. City of Kansas City, 952 F. Supp. 1467, 
1477 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 47. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment. Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 48. Id. at 239. 
 49. Id. at 241. 
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law recognized civil liability for aiding and abetting under section 876, 
but nonetheless declined to find the defendant liable.50 
In the context of securities law, the Supreme Court cited Halberstam to 
suggest that aiding and abetting liability does not have a concrete basis at 
common law.51 Its reliance on Halberstam for this proposition is surpris-
ing. Although the court in Halberstam conceded that many courts failed 
to apply the doctrine clearly, the court did not question its validity as a 
cause of action.52 In fact, the court in Halberstam was optimistic about 
the extension of aiding and abetting and tort law generally to redress 
“newly emerging notions of economic justice.”53 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts formulation of aiding and abetting 
has not been unequivocally adopted in some jurisdictions.54 Still, it is 
often the case that the cause of action is available when applied to a 
straightforward set of facts. For example, aiding and abetting has been 
applied to litigation involving fraud,55 products liability,56 terrorism,57 
and libel.58 But given the breadth and novelty of wrongs that aiding and 
                                                                                                             
 50. Rice v. Paladin Enter., 940 F. Supp. 836, 842, 849 (D. Md. 1996), rev’d, 128 F.3d 
233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 51. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 
(1994). The Court quoted Halberstam:  
The doctrine has been at best uncertain in application, however. As the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted in a comprehensive opinion 
on the subject, the leading cases applying this doctrine are statutory securities 
cases, with the common-law precedents “largely confined to isolated acts of 
adolescents in rural society.” 
Id. 
 52. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478. 
 53. Id. at 489. 
 54. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. S. Prawer & Co., 829 F. Supp. 453, 457 (D. 
Me. 1993) (in Maine, “it is clear . . . that aiding and abetting liability did not exist under 
the common law, but was entirely a creature of statute”); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 
83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10471, at *34 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1991) (cause of action 
under Restatement § 876 “has not yet been applied as a basis for liability” by Pennsyl-
vania courts); Meadow Ltd. P’ship v. Heritage Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 639 F. Supp. 643, 653 
(E.D. Va. 1986) (aiding and abetting tort based on Restatement § 876 “not expressly rec-
ognized by the state courts of the Commonwealth [of Virginia]”). 
 55. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 
742 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 56. See, e.g., In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 
F.3d 1484 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 57. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F.2d 774, 801–08 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
However, it is worth noting that the plaintiff brought an action in conspiracy, not aiding 
and abetting. Id. at 798. 
 58. See, e.g., Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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abetting has been applied to redress, it is not surprising that these actions 
have been met with resistance, particularly within these contexts. 
B. Customary International Law 
Customary international law is a set of normative standards that have 
achieved a general degree of international consensus.59 These standards 
are derived from international conventions, the judicial decisions from 
international tribunals, and general principles of law that are widely rec-
ognized within civilized nations.60 Contemporary discussions on aiding 
and abetting law generally focus on interpretations of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court and the decisions rendered by special 
international tribunals involving Germany, Rwanda, and the former 
Yugoslavia. Generally, the divergence in opinion regarding these sources 
arises over what the sources stand for collectively, rather than what each 
says on its own. Still, interpretations do vary.61 
Aiding and abetting was recognized as a basis for criminal liability by 
the Nürnberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”), an international court formed 
after World War II to punish violators of international law. Control 
Council Law No. 10, which established these courts, provided for the 
culpability of officers that did not directly carry out war crimes but were 
nonetheless responsible for assisting in their commission.62 However, 
                                                                                                             
 59. Customary international law is defined by the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law as “law [that] results from a general and consistent practice of states fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). 
 60. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933. See also Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980). 
 61. See, e.g., Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decisions for Issues Arising Under 
the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 479–85 (2007); Daniel Diskin, Note, The 
Historical and Modern Foundations for Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 805 (2005); Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in 
Alien Tort Cases (Apr. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with Author). 
 62. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, 
Crimes against Peace and Against Humanity, Jan. 20, 1946, 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE 
CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50. Article 2(2) explains: 
[A] person . . . is deemed to have committed a crime . . . if he was (a) a princi-
pal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered or 
abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with 
plans or enterprises involving its commission . . . . 
Id. art. 2(2) (emphasis added). 
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there has been judicial disagreement over the mental state required to 
find a defendant culpable.63 
This difficulty arose in part from a mens rea threshold in one trial that 
diverged from the generally applied standard. In The Ministries Case, the 
court acquitted Karl Rasche,64 a German industrialist accused of know-
ingly providing loans to businesses that relied on forced labor.65 Despite 
evidence indicating that Rasche was substantially certain his funding 
would facilitate criminal activity, the NMT acquitted the chairman.66 It 
stated: “We cannot go so far as to enunciate the proposition that the offi-
cial of a loaning bank is chargeable with the illegal operations alleged to 
have resulted from loans or which may have been contemplated by the 
borrower.”67 Thus, this case has been cited for the proposition that the 
NMT required a purposeful mens rea to convict a party accused of ena-
bling human rights violations.68 In other words, culpability attaches only 
where there is evidence that a third-party defendant assisted the direct 
wrongdoer and intended primarily to facilitate an international crime. 
The standard applied during the trial of Karl Rasche can be distin-
guished and dismissed as an outlying case. Scholars have pointed to 
other trials conducted by the NMT in which culpability attached to de-
fendants for knowingly—but not purposefully—contributing to the 
commission of an international crime.69 
For example, in United States v. Flick, a German industrialist was con-
victed of international crimes based on his knowledge and approval of 
decisions made by his deputy, Bernard Weiss, to use Russian prisoners 
of war as slave labor.70 The evidence presented at trial indicated that 
Weiss, who was also convicted, actively pursued increasing production 
                                                                                                             
 63. See, e.g., Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254. See also supra notes 28–32 and accompany-
ing text (detailing the disagreement between Judges Katzmann and Hall). 
 64. Karl Rasche was chairman of the Dresdner Bank. See United States v. Von 
Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), in 12–14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 853 (1949). 
 65. Id. at 852. 
 66. Id. at 852–55. 
 67. See id. at 854. 
 68. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276. 
 69. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Ran-
goon—An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Mul-
tinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 113–17 (2002). 
 70. United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 3 
(1949). See generally Ramasastry, supra note 69. 
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in light of the decreased cost of forced labor.71 However, there were no 
facts to indicate that Weiss sought primarily to enslave Russian prisoners 
of war. Rather, Weiss’ purpose in utilizing slave labor was presumably to 
make money.72 Thus, Flick is often cited for the proposition that defen-
dant’s knowledge that his actions will incidentally result in an interna-
tional crime is sufficient to establish aiding and abetting liability.73 
Similarly, in United States v. Krupp, knowledge appears to have satis-
fied the mens rea requirement necessary to convict eleven of twelve em-
ployees of the Krupp firm charged with deportation, exploitation, and 
abuse of slave labor.74 
Another trial, U.S. v. Krauch,75 is particularly noteworthy because the 
successful criminal charges against Farben were followed by a civil ac-
tion brought by forced laborers seeking redress for unpaid wages. In the 
private action, a German court held Farben liable for negligently failing 
to protect the plaintiff’s life, body, and health.76 
A concept of aiding and abetting similar to one set forth in Control 
Council No. 10 was implicitly applied in Hong Kong during the 
                                                                                                             
 71. United States v. Flick (The Flick Case), in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 3, 
1198, 1202 (1949). 
 72. Id. at 1198. 
 73. See Edwin V. Woodsome, Jr. & T. Jason White, Corporate Liability for Conduct 
of a Foreign Government: The Ninth Circuit Adopts a “Reason to Know” Standard for 
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 89, 108 (2003) (discussing Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310). 
 74. United States v. Krupp (The Krupp Case), in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 
1448–49 (1950). See generally Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Indus-
trialists: The “Other Schindlers,” 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 173, 229–49 (1995). 
 75. United States v. Krauch (The Farben Case), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1132 
(1952). The NMT stated: 
Where private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the 
military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent 
of the former owner, such action, not being expressly justified by any applica-
ble provision of the Hague Regulations, is in violation of international law. The 
payment of a price or other adequate consideration does not, under such cir-
cumstances, relieve the act of its unlawful character. 
Id. 
 76. See Ramasastry, supra note 69, at 107–08 n.63 (citing the decision in Wollheim v. 
I.G. Farben in Liquidation, Frankfurt District Court, June 10, 1953, court file no. 
2/3/040651). Farben and Wollheim eventually settled the claim. 
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Kinkaseki Mine trial.77 Pursuant to that trial, a civil action was brought 
by prisoners of war against the Nippon Mining Company to obtain re-
dress for their forced mine labor, during which the prisoners of war were 
allegedly given little food or medical care and were allegedly subjected 
to violence.78 
Thus, although many of these tribunals did not explicitly set forth a 
standard for third-party liability, their conviction of those who indirectly 
perpetuated international crime suggests that purposeful intent was not a 
prerequisite to finding culpability. In Zyklon B,79 however, a British mili-
tary court offered more clarity regarding the mens rea standard it ap-
plied.80 The defendants sold poison gas to the Nazi party knowing that it 
would be used to commit mass murder, but without any specific intent to 
harm those persons.81 Nonetheless, the tribunal found the defendants cul-
pable, explicitly holding that knowledge without purposeful intent was 
sufficient to create culpability in that situation.82 
The Einsatzgruppen tribunal also presents a clear formulation on the 
mental state required in order to convict a third-party for assisting in the 
commission of a crime.83 The NMT suggested that it would not exoner-
ate a Nazi interpreter who turned over lists of Communist party members 
to his organization, knowing that the people listed would be executed 
when found.84 The NMT held that in performing that function, the trans-
lator had “served as an accessory to the crime.”85 
More recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (“ICTY”) have also recognized criminal liability under the theory 
                                                                                                             
 77. See Ramasastry, supra note 69, at 113–18 (analyzing contemporaneous newspa-
per reports of the trial of employees of the Japanese Nippon Mining Company by the 
British War Crimes Court in Hong Kong in 1947). See also Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. 
Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and Aiding and Abetting Under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 71 (2003) (attributing 
conviction of corporate officers in the Kinkaseki Mine trial to language relating to aiding 
and abetting contained in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East art. 5, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1587). 
 78. For a discussion of this “overlooked” area of civil and criminal culpability for 
complicity and forced labor, see Ramasastry, supra note 69, at 113–17. 
 79. In re Tesch (Zyklon B Case), 13 I.L.R. 250 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946). 
 80. See Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 77, at 75 (discussing Zyklon B). 
 81. See In re Tesch (Zyklon B Case), 13 I.L.R. 250. 
 82. See Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 77, at 75. 
 83. United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen Case), in 4 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at 3, 569 (1950). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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of aiding and abetting. These tribunals looked to the NMT to determine 
the international law standards for aiding and abetting. Incorporating 
these sources, the tribunal in Prosecutor v. Furundzija86 determined that 
a defendant’s culpability for aiding and abetting turned on whether “the 
defendant knew that his or her actions would aid the offense,”87 but did 
not require that an accomplice share a common purpose with the actual 
perpetrators of the crime.88 
While most agree on the standards generally applied by tribunals in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, a number of scholars and judges 
have questioned whether these courts should be relied upon as a mean-
ingful source of international law. In particular, they point out that these 
tribunals were formed ad hoc to address isolated catastrophes and applied 
a jurisprudence that had not necessarily been accepted or verified by the 
international community.89 These commentators instead look to interna-
tional treaties, such as the Rome Statute, as a more effective barometer of 
international norms.90 
C. Why This is a False Conflict 
Judge Katzmann relies on Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, and cor-
rectly notes that it “makes clear that, other than assistance rendered to the 
commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common pur-
pose, a defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of a 
crime only if he does so ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of such a crime.’”91 The Rome Statute established the ICC, a permanent 
international tribunal formed to punish those who committed serious in-
ternational crimes.92 Although the Rome Statute is arguably more ex-
                                                                                                             
 86. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case. No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998). 
 87. Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 77, at 74 (“A defendant’s culpability for aiding 
and abetting an international law offense will attach only if the defendant knew that his or 
her actions would aid the offense. The accomplice does not need to share the mens rea of 
the principal.”). 
 88. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case. No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 236–48 (Dec. 
10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 180–81 (Jan. 
27, 2000). 
 89. See, e.g., Frank Christian Olah, MNC Liability for International Human Rights 
Violations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 751, 797 (2007). 
 90. But see David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal 
Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 53 (2002) (“Narrow-minded analyses that only exam-
ine the ICC Treaty and ignore the supplemental documents can be greatly misleading and 
are simply erroneous.”). 
 91. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275 (quoting article 25(3) of the Rome Statute). 
 92. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3), July 17, 1997, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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plicit on aiding and abetting than either the Statute of the ICTY93 or of 
the ICTR,94 the Rome Statute is not a stable foundation for the interpreta-
tion of the ATS. Article 25(3) of the statute codifies aiding and abetting, 
but fails to incorporate any requirements for finding causation: 
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court if that person: 
. . . 
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commis-
sion, including providing the means for its commission; 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted com-
mission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime;95 
Scholars disagree over the interpretation of “for the purpose of facili-
tating.” Some scholars believe that it imposes an intent requirement, 
while others believe that it leaves the traditional knowledge requirement 
intact. Some critics have posited that the statute is also unclear on mens 
rea,96 while others accept that article 25(3) requires a purposeful state of 
mind but also argue that the burden of meeting this threshold is too re-
                                                                                                             
 93. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(1), 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (“A person who planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execu-
tion of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually 
responsible for the crime.”). 
 94. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(1), S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, com-
mitted or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime 
referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the 
crime.”). 
 95. Rome Statute, supra note 92, art. 25(3)(c)–(d). 
 96. See, e.g., Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 671 (2007). 
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strictive to be effective.97 It does not matter, however, which position is 
correct—as Robert Cryer has pointed out, article 25(3) neither reflects 
nor declares customary international law.98 
By his own admission, Judge Katzmann in Khulumani was trying to 
determine what definition of aiding and abetting was so “‘well-
established[] [and] universally recognized’ to be considered customary 
international law for the purposes of the [ATS].”99 That definition is the 
one articulated in Furundzija and the other cases cited above, not the 
definition provided by article 25(3). The Rome Statute thus should not 
have played a role—at least not a determinative one—in Judge Katz-
mann’s analysis.100 The test international law produces should look a lot 
like the test produced by domestic tort law. 
II. WHY THE CONFLICT MATTERS 
A. The Apparent Overinclusiveness of Tort Law in the ATS 
The disagreement over the source of aiding and abetting liability for 
the purpose of ascertaining corporate susceptibility to suit for funding or 
supplying human rights violators under the ATS may be a false conflict, 
                                                                                                             
 97. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Reichard, Catching the Money Train: Using the Alien Tort 
Claims Act to Hold Private Banks Liable for Human Rights Abuses, 36 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 255, 271 (2004). 
 98. ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 315–16 (2005). Cryer explains: 
[T]he Article also introduces a purposive, motive requirement that is not re-
quired by custom (under which knowledge suffices). The crime is thus not de-
fined in accordance with customary international law, but in practice the addi-
tion of the purposive intent will render liability under the Rome Statute more 
narrowly than in custom . . . .  
Id. 
 99. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d 
Cir. 1995)). 
 100. Katzmann cited to cases that found aiding and abetting liability under the ATS but 
relied on sources of law other than the Rome Statute. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277. These 
included Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), Bowoto 
v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, 2006 WL 2455752 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006), and In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 
7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277. In particular, Katzmann noted that Pres-
byterian had found that “[a]iding and abetting liability is a specifically defined norm of 
international character that is properly applied as the law of nations for purposes of the 
[ATS].” Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (quoting Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
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but what if it were not? To put it another way, when would a divergence 
between international law and domestic law affect the application of the 
ATS? 
The truth is, this question has not been squarely addressed because of a 
very simple feature of the relationship between international law and 
domestic tort law: the latter is overinclusive of the former. This relation-
ship between international law and domestic tort law was nicely illus-
trated in Sosa. The plaintiff, Alvarez, sued under the Federal Torts Claim 
Act and the ATS because he was kidnapped by bounty hunters hired by 
the U.S. government.101 The surviving ATS claim was described by Jus-
tice Souter as a putative violation of the putative customary international 
law norm against arbitrary arrest.102 Therefore, the ATS claim failed to 
meet the Sosa test for a violation of customary international law cogni-
zable under the ATS. The Court found that the prohibition against arbi-
trary arrest was “a norm with less definite content and acceptance among 
civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 [the 
ATS] was enacted” 103 because it was “a single illegal detention of less 
than one day.”104 However, had the Court found that the detention vio-
lated customary international law, there would have been no shortage of 
legal support for the claim that the detention violated domestic tort law. 
Common law recognizes false imprisonment as a tort that can be claimed 
by persons who have been detained without privilege for periods of less 
than twenty-four hours.105 
In fact, a moment’s reflection reveals that virtually every international 
law violation alleged under the ATS has a counterpart in American tort 
law. Genocide, torture, and rape are all incidents of battery, assault, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, and where death results, wrong-
ful death. Slave labor is a form of false imprisonment, as is excessive 
detention. Even in the earliest cases in which the Court found interna-
tional law violations by relying on norms with “definite content and ac-
ceptance among civilized nations,” these violations could be easily recast 
as common law torts. The attack upon the French diplomat in the “Mar-
bois incident” was a battery.106 Piracy was, among other things, trespass 
                                                                                                             
 101. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98. 
 102. Id. at 736. 
 103. Id. at 732. 
 104. Id. at 738. 
 105. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 112 (1976); Grant v. Stop-N-Go 
Market of Texas, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 106. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784), cited in Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 716–17. According to a recent argument by Thomas H. Lee, the historical purpose 
of the ATS was originally limited to the protection of the international law right of “safe 
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to chattel.107 The “plunder” of a British colony in Sierra Leone must have 
implicated the torts of trespass to land and chattel, if not battery, assault, 
and false imprisonment.108 
It is not true as a matter of theory or practice that every violation of in-
ternational law cognizable under the ATS must be a tort under the com-
mon law.109 According to Judge Katzmann, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 “confers 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction when the following three conditions 
are satisfied: (1) an alien sues, (2) for a tort, (3) committed in violation of 
the law of nations.”110 Logically speaking, an alien could sue for a tort 
cognizable under the common law that is based on a wrong that is not a 
wrong in international law. This is arguably what happened in Adra v. 
Clift.111 There, the tort alleged was the taking of a minor child from the 
custodial parent and the international law violation alleged was the falsi-
fication of a passport.112 While taking a child from a parent may be a 
                                                                                                             
conduct” for ambassadors. See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien 
Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 860–66 (2006). While I agree with G. Edward 
White that this is an extremely narrow reading of the original purpose of the statute, for 
purposes of this Article, I do not need to rely on historical intent. See G. Edward White, A 
Customary International Law of Torts 22–26 (U. Virginia Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 34, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art34; Scarborough, supra note 61, at 467 (“[T]he historical evi-
dence suggests that the ATS was originally enacted as a measure to provide a forum for 
aggrieved aliens who might face significant discrimination when seeking to enforce state-
created rights in state courts.”). 
 107. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607), cited in Sosa, 542 U.S. 
at 720; Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895), cited in Sosa, 542 U.S. 
at 720. 
 108. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795), cited in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720–21 (discussing Attor-
ney William Bradford’s views on the availability of civil redress for British victims of a 
French attack in Sierra Leone in United States federal court). 
 109. This is a logical claim, and not an empirical claim, although as my discussion of 
Adra v. Clift, infra, will show, this is one time when an examination of the exception 
might help prove the rule. Furthermore, I take my claim here to be nothing more than the 
converse of the claim that the original purpose of the ATS was to provide a cause of ac-
tion for wrongs qua violations of the law of nations, and not their state common law ana-
logs. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts 
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 490–91 (1986); 
Lee, supra note 106, at 888. 
 110. Kuhlumani, 504 F.3d at 267 (quoting Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 
1995)). 
 111. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). 
 112. Id. at 864–65. In Adra: 
[D]espite the fact that the child Najwa was a Lebanese national, not entitled to 
be admitted to the United States under an Iraqi passport, defendant concealed 
Najwa’s name and nationality, caused her to be included in defendant’s Iraqi 
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tort—although, as I will argue, this is not obvious—falsifying a passport 
is not a tort. Rather, it is a violation of the law of nations and a violation 
of the public laws of the United States. 
Adra is doubly interesting because the tort alleged was not one, like 
battery or trespass to chattels, that could be located easily in the common 
law of every state. The tort of “the unlawful taking or withholding of a 
minor child from the custody of the parent or parents entitled to such 
custody”113 is not universally recognized by the common law. The court 
cited to a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts to establish that 
there could be a claim for redress by one parent against another for the 
deprivation of a child’s companionship, but the tort alleged was by no 
means well established or deeply rooted in U.S. common law.114 
Adra, which was decided in 1961 and is one of the modern pre-
Filártiga cases, is a literal application of Judge Katzmann’s two-pronged 
jurisdictional test under the ATS.115 Under this approach, the court first 
establishes jurisdiction and then identifies a tort that is causally related to 
the international law violation that created the jurisdiction. However, 
Judge Katzmann’s model, which parallels Adra, is not without precedent. 
Judge Harry Edwards argued explicitly for the adoption of the Adra ap-
proach in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, an important post-Filártiga 
case: “The Adra formulation adopts a two-step jurisdictional test, requir-
                                                                                                             
passport, and succeeded in having her admitted to the United States thereby. 
These were wrongful acts not only against the United States, but against the 
Lebanese Republic, which is entitled to control the issuance of passports to its 
nationals. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. at 862. 
 114. Id. (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103 (2d ed. 
1955) and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 700 cmt. c (1939)). 
 115.  In a case with very similar facts, an ATS claim was rejected, in part because the 
court rejected Adra’s two-step approach:  
Although Plaintiff characterizes Adra v. Clift as finding the mother’s alleged 
abduction of the child to be a violation of a law of nations, the cases’s approach 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 was more complex. In Adra, the court found jurisdiction 
using a two-step process. First it identified a municipal tort: “the unlawful tak-
ing or withholding of a minor child from the custody of the parent or parents 
entitled to such custody.” Then, the court found the mother's misuse of her 
passport constituted a violation of the law of nations, emphasizing that use of 
passports must be taken seriously. The Adra court’s two-step approach to § 
1350 has not been widely adopted. 
See Taveras v. Taveras, 397 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916 n.7 (D. Ohio 2005) (citations om-
itted). 
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ing what would appear to be a looser allegation of a law of nations of-
fense, coupled with a municipal tort.”116 
This two-step approach, however, is not the same as the two-step ap-
proach espoused by Sosa.117 Sosa requires first that the court satisfy ju-
risdiction based on an alleged violation of a treaty or customary interna-
tional law.118 If jurisdiction is based on the latter, the court must satisfy 
itself that “the common law . . . provide[s] a cause of action for the mod-
est number of international law violations thought to carry personal li-
ability at the time . . . .”119 The Supreme Court did not adopt Judge Ed-
wards’ test from Tel-Oren and, by extension, it did not adopt the analysis 
offered by the court in Adra. In Sosa, the Court identified violations of 
international law, if any, that provided the grounds for liability under the 
ATS. That holding does not address the analytically distinct question of 
whether a claim for redress under the ATS may be based on a wrong that 
is not also a jurisdiction-granting violation of international law (i.e., a 
tort grounded purely in common law). Consequently, it remains a logical 
possibility that the Court’s two-step approach in Sosa is compatible with 
the two-step approach in Adra. As I will argue in the next section, how-
ever, there are good reasons to believe that the ATS should be incom-
patible with the two-step test in Adra. 
B. Why the “Tort” in the Alien Tort Statute is Not Municipal Tort Law 
The temptation to look to domestic law—or “municipal law” in the 
parlance of some120—is easy to see. As Judge Edwards noted, the alter-
native view would impose on judges the “awesome duty . . . to derive 
from an amorphous entity—i.e., the ‘law of nations’—the standards of 
liability applicable in concrete situations.”121 Even for a judge sympa-
thetic to the cause of human rights, such as Judge Edwards, asking fed-
eral judges to discern concrete tort actions out of international law puts 
                                                                                                             
 116. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F.2d 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring).  A very good analysis of the approach endorsed by Judges Katzmann and 
Reinhardt can be found in Keitner, supra note 61, at 28–30. Keitner labels the municipal 
law—or “two-step” approach—as the “ancillary question” approach. Id. at 29–38. 
 117. See William S. Dodge. Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. 
Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 97–100 
(2004) (on Sosa’s “two step” test). 
 118. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698–99 (2004). 
 119. Id. at 694. 
 120. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law 
Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 32 (1985) 
(“[T]he [ATS] requires a municipal tort cognizable under American law plus a violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty.”). 
 121. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
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the ATS in a precarious position. It makes too obvious what conservative 
critics of the ATS have been saying—that ATS litigation gives judges 
unbounded discretion to impose their own values on the disputes before 
them.122 
The municipal law theory of the ATS can be seen as a preemptive 
strike on the argument that since the Erie revolution, there has been no 
federal common law of torts upon which to draw and therefore the ATS 
refers to an empty set of norms until Congress chooses to fill it with ex-
plicit rights of action.123 This is the thrust of Justice Scalia’s disagree-
ment with Justice Souter in Sosa. Scalia concedes that at one time, it may 
have been possible for the ATS to direct the federal courts to a body of 
tort law from which to read off the causes of action triggered by a viola-
tion of international law or a treaty, but that was made impossible by the 
advent of Erie v. Tompkins.124 Erie famously declared that there was no 
such thing as common law outside of the command of some sovereign, 
which means, argued Scalia, that absent a command of Congress, there 
could be no cause of action for a tort in violation of the law of nations.125 
Scalia’s point was about both content and authority. The authority 
point is simple: “Because post-Erie federal common law is made, not 
discovered, federal courts must possess some federal-common-law-
making authority before undertaking to craft it.”126 The content point is 
less obvious, but it has to do with the fact that the federal courts have 
made common law absent express delegation in a variety of contexts, 
ranging from admiralty law to constitutional torts.127 Scalia argues that 
these episodes are “exceptions,”128 a point which, although controversial, 
is not crucial to my current argument. What is crucial to my argument is 
that the fields of common-law-making occupied by the federal courts can 
be said to possess a relatively rich and easily discernible body of substan-
tive rules of liability and remedy. This is certainly true of admiralty law, 
a body of law that developed through centuries and possesses clear doc-
trinal rules and principles. 
If, like Judge Edwards, one was concerned that the ATS, if it were to 
survive, had to be tethered to a body of law that offered judges clear 
                                                                                                             
 122. See Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism: There’s One Way in Which America is 
as Bad as Belgium, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2003, available at http://www.opinionjournal 
.com/extra/?id=110003659. 
 123. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 824, 827. 
 124. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 740 (quoting Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). 
 125. Id. at 741. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 742. 
 128. Id. 
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rules and principles just like admiralty law, then it is easy to see why one 
would be tempted by the idea that the torts triggered by international law 
violations simply be read off the U.S. municipal tort law. Tort law, at 
least for anyone who does not actually teach it or practice it, might ap-
pear to be quite stable and easy to locate. After all, there is the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts and Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts—
how hard could it be to figure out what constitutes a tort in the United 
States? 
I will not respond to Scalia’s point about the federal court’s lack of au-
thority to make tort law through common law methods of reasoning un-
der the ATS. Many scholars have responded to the Bradley & Goldsmith 
argument upon which it is based,129 and there may be no better refutation 
of the argument than Souter’s in Sosa itself.130 In this Part, I argue that 
those who wish to resist Scalia gain no advantage by adopting the posi-
tion that the ATS merely requires a federal judge to apply municipal tort 
law to the case before her. If this is an effort to throw the Scalias of the 
world a bone, it is a bad idea for two reasons. 
First, the defender of the ATS who hopes to hold off a critic like Scalia 
by explaining that the ATS simply asks federal courts to look to the well 
defined body of tort law of a domestic jurisdiction sacrifices much of the 
ATS’s importance in a futile quest to buy peace with an implacable 
critic. As the court noted in Xuncax v. Gramajo,131 even if it were more 
                                                                                                             
 129. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International 
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); 
Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filártiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights 
and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997). 
 130. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–730. Souter explained: 
Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new substantive rules, no 
matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has identified lim-
ited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a 
common law way. For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of 
the United States recognizes the law of nations. . . . We think it would be un-
reasonable to assume that the First Congress would have expected federal 
courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply 
because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to 
modern realism. 
Id. I would note that, despite being one of the authors approvingly cited by Bradley & 
Goldsmith, I have never maintained that, in American jurisprudence, legal positivism is 
the same as legal realism, or any theory of law that requires adjudication to be based on 
an interpretation of a human sovereign. In fact, I have labored in my writings to say ex-
actly the opposite. See generally ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1998). 
 131. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). 
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convenient, from a practical point of view, to answer the question of 
what torts are authorized under the ATS by a violation of international 
law, the court would convert a claim under the ATS from a claim con-
cerning the violation of human rights into one concerning the violation of 
local private rights. Judge Woodlock’s own words are exactly right: 
This . . . concerns the proper characterization of the kind of 
wrongs meant to be addressed under § 1350: those perpetrated 
by hostis humani generis (“enemies of all humankind”) in 
contravention of jus cogens (peremptory norms of interna-
tional law). In this light, municipal tort law is an inadequate 
placeholder for such values. . . . Given the seeming inade-
quacy of municipal law to address, meaningfully, such human 
rights violations as are at issue here—i.e., torture, summary 
execution, disappearances—there appears little warrant to look 
to municipal law exclusively for guidance in redressing these 
violations.132 
Judge Woodlock’s point is not that only international law can properly 
name the wrong for which plaintiffs have demanded redress under the 
ATS. He has no problem with, and in fact applies with gusto, plaintiffs’ 
claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”).133 
Conservative critics have never treated the TVPA with the same sort of 
skepticism that characterizes Scalia’s reaction to the ATS in Sosa be-
cause the TVPA is a clear and unambiguous exercise of Congress’s 
power. But that is not the only virtue of the TVPA; claims under the 
TVPA have the virtue of moral clarity and candor. As Judge Woodlock 
pointed out in a footnote, “I question the appropriateness of using a mu-
nicipal wrongful death statute to address summary executions or ‘disap-
pearances.’ Similarly, I doubt any municipal law is available to address 
the crime of genocide adequately.”134 The difference between a claim 
under the ATS for wrongful death versus genocide is the same as the dif-
ference between bringing a claim under the TVPA for battery or assault 
and torture. 
Judge Woodlock’s point goes to the very heart of why the ATS exists 
at all. As he noted, in Adra the legal wrong for which the plaintiff sought 
redress did not align with the “jurisdictional hook”—that is, the wrong in 
international law that brought the case within the ATS.135 This alignment 
                                                                                                             
 132. Id. at 183. 
 133. Id. at 176–78, citing Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 
106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
 134. Id. at 183 n.24. 
 135. Id. at 183 (“[A] case like Adra begs the question of how closely allied the alleged 
violations of international and municipal law must be. Could they be wholly unrelated, 
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problem can be seen in a variety of contexts, although the best analog is 
a case in which the plaintiff tried to bootstrap its burden to prove breach 
of duty by alleging that the defendant violated a municipal law that was 
not designed to protect the interest that was in fact injured.136 The classic 
case from first-year torts, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., involved 
a claim by a party who suffered a personal injury (Mrs. Palsgraf) that 
arose from the breach of a duty by the defendant railroad not to negli-
gently injure the property of a third party (who, incidentally, did not sue 
the railroad).137 Tort law offers other examples, such as the limitation 
that, in order for a plaintiff to benefit from the doctrine of per se negli-
gence, the plaintiff must show that “[t]he hazard out of which the acci-
dent ensued must have been the particular hazard or class of hazards that 
the statutory safeguard in the thought and purpose of the Legislature was 
intended to correct.” 138 This problem is also illustrated in Holocaust liti-
gation in which Jewish slave laborers worked to near death in German 
factories sued corporate defendants for unjust enrichment139 based on a 
violation of their interest against racially- or religiously-motivated kill-
ing, e.g., genocide, and not a violation of their interest in being paid for 
their work or in receiving the full value of property that, from the per-
spective of the law of equity, had been placed in a constructive trust.140 
Second, it simply is not true that recourse to municipal tort law makes 
the “awesome duty,” as Judge Edwards put it, any easier, or the product 
more palatable to a skeptic like Scalia.141 
                                                                                                             
different in kind as well as degree?”). In my discussion below, I use the word “align” as a 
synonym for “ally.” 
 136. See, e.g., Victor v. Hedges, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (violation of 
vehicular statute that prohibited parking on a sidewalk not per se negligence where plain-
tiff was struck by a third party who spun out of control as a result of regular negligence 
on the roadway). 
137. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). See also JOHN C.P. 
GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES 
AND REDRESS 312–13 (2d ed. 2008). (discussing the “alignment problem” and Palsgraf). 
 138. De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler, 179 N.E.2d 764 (N.Y. 1932).  
 139. See Anthony J. Sebok, A Brief History of Mass Restitution Litigation in the 
United States, in CALLING POWER TO ACCOUNT 341 (David Dyzenhaus & Mayo Moran 
eds., 2005). 
 140.  Others have made the same argument, using different terminology. Keitner, for 
example, labels the approach endorsed by Judges Pregerson, Hall, and Woodlock the 
“conduct-regulating rules” approach. See Keitner, supra note 61, at 38–60. She identifies 
the central virtue of this approach as follows: “[U]nder the ATS, international law pro-
vides and defines the right . . . and domestic law provides and defines the remedy.” Id. at 
40.  
 141. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F.2d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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Municipal law will not provide federal judges with a body of law au-
thorized with any specificity unless the municipal law is the law of a 
municipality. While very few interpreters of the ATS have advanced this 
argument, it seems to be exactly what the Ninth Circuit meant in Marcos 
Estate I.142 There, the court argued that the adoption of Judge Edwards’s 
position meant that the applicable municipal tort law was the law of the 
Philippines.143 This result is precise, but bizarre; under this logic, the 
substantive tort law in each ATS case would depend on the choice of law 
analysis of the federal judge.144 This would turn Judge Friendly’s argu-
ment defending federal common law on its head. In his famous article, In 
Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, Friendly argued 
that the federal common law that remained after Erie would be of great 
value to litigants in federal court because it would be more uniform and 
far more predictable than the much broader federal common law that ex-
isted under Swift v. Tyson.145 
It is unlikely that courts really intend to refer to the municipal law of a 
jurisdiction when they use the expression “municipal law.” It is more 
likely that they intend to refer to federal common law in the spirit of the 
rule of substantive law that federal courts invoke when they interpret 
statutory torts created by Congress (such as the federal antitrust laws), 146 
implied rights of action (such as rights under federal regulatory power147 
or constitutional torts),148 or certain areas of law that have been explicitly 
reserved to the federal courts post-Erie (such as admiralty law).149 But 
none of this law has a fixed meaning, as anyone who has written or prac-
ticed in this area understands. To take but one example, the U.S. Su-
preme Court did not simply read the law off of an existing municipal 
code when it considered whether to restrict the tort available to railway 
workers under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act to the “zone of dan-
                                                                                                             
 142. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 143. Id. at 503. 
 144. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 182 n.22. As Judge Woodlock pointed out, it made little 
sense to say that the plaintiffs in Xuncax—Guatemalens who were tortured, killed, and 
raped in Guatemala—should be required to frame their claim for redress under the ATS 
according to the specific statutory and decisional law of Massachusetts’ law of intentional 
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borough, supra note 61. 
 145. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964). 
 146. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). 
 147. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). 
 148. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). 
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ger rule” or to permit bystander liability for emotional distress.150 Nor did 
the Court simply “make it up,” as Scalia would characterize the process 
of post-Erie federal-common-law-making. Instead, the Court engaged in 
a searching review of the practices of the fifty states and the policies that 
lay behind them, and then made a choice between the two available 
rules.151 One might disagree with the choice that was made, but that is 
not the point. The point is that common-law-making by federal courts is 
attractive not because of its predictability, but because of the quality of 
the reasoning that goes into the final result. 
So far, nothing I have argued necessarily refutes the argument for us-
ing municipal law as the source of law for the “tort” in the “Alien Tort 
Act”—if municipal law includes “those sources properly used by federal 
courts to identify the plaintiffs’ right to redress.” There is an unspoken 
assumption that those sources are easy to identify—unspoken, I say, be-
cause, except for a handful of courts like Marcos Estate I, it is assumed 
that the sources are the same as those used by the federal courts when 
they interpret the tort law contained in a statute like the Federal Em-
ployer’s Liability Act.152 
But this assumption is false. The correct answer to the question, “What 
sources ought a federal court use to identify the plaintiff’s right to re-
dress?” depends on the allegedly violated interest. For example, when the 
plaintiff seeks redress for a violation of an interest protected by admiralty 
law, the sources of law are different than those that apply when the plain-
tiff seeks redress for a violation of an interest protected by federal regula-
tions of the workplace or the U.S. Constitution.153 In the admiralty case 
Reliable Transfer Co., the question before the federal courts was whether 
to keep the archaic American rule of divided damages or to adopt the 
more modern rule of proportionate liability (or comparative fault).154 The 
U.S. Supreme Court looked to a wide range of sources, including but not 
restricted to U.S. court decisions.155 It also took note of the practices of 
                                                                                                             
 150. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). 
 151. Id. at 554–57 (choosing the zone of danger rule). 
   152.  In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 153. See White, supra note 106, at 42–44 (using admiralty law to make the same 
point). 
 154. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. at 404. 
 155. Id. Here I part ways with White, with whom I am in agreement on almost all other 
points. Citing Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), he notes that when faced with 
the problem of adjudicating a tort issue in admiralty law, federal courts apply “general 
common law tort principles.” White, supra note 106, at 66. Wells involved a defamation 
suit based on conduct that took place on a ship in international waters. Wells, 186 F.3d at 
517. The Fifth Circuit correctly refused to apply the law of any American state, and 
noted: “[I]t appears that there is no well-developed body of general maritime law of 
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other nations and international compacts to which the United States was 
not a signatory, as well as theoretical concerns elucidated by scholars 
concerned with the question of which rule was best, all things consid-
ered.156 This approach is not limited only to admiralty law. Judge 
Friendly, writing in defense of the “new” federal common law, noted that 
shortly after Erie, the Supreme Court decided that Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, a case that involved an innocent error by a bank that de-
posited a check issued by the federal government, should be decided by 
the “federal law merchant.”157 
What are the sources of law appropriate to answer the question: What 
is the plaintiff’s right to redress where there is an alleged violation of an 
interest not to be subjected to torture, slave labor, genocide, etc.? To 
quote Sosa in another context, it would be “passing strange”158 if the ap-
propriate sources of law would be exclusively the common law of the 
fifty states. This is for two reasons, both described in greater detail 
above. First, there is a lack of alignment between the interests protected 
by the rights to redress identified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Second, there is no more reason to restrict interpretation to purely do-
mestic sources of law where the interests protected are grounded in the 
law of nations than there would be reason to restrict interpretation of ad-
miralty law to purely domestic sources. 
CONCLUSION 
My argument ends at this point, although it obviously leaves important 
and urgent business unfinished. If we know that the sources of the law of 
redress under the ATS are not restricted by municipal or domestic law, 
how do we identify the proper set of sources? That obviously must be 
left for another day and another article. If my argument is correct, how-
ever, it should put federal courts and litigators on notice that there is no 
reason to assume that the law of torts in the ATS looks anything like the 
law of torts in the fifty states, or even in the federal common law of 
                                                                                                             
defamation. In such a situation, it is clear that the general maritime law may be supple-
mented by either state law or more general common law principles.” Id. at 42. My point 
is that, while there is a structural similarity to the analysis performed by the court in 
Wells and cases involving the ATS, the content or substance of the law that “supple-
ments” the “general transnational” tort law will be different. Whereas the Wells court 
may have been justified in limiting itself to the law of the fifty states, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and scholarship published in the United States, a court adjudicating the 
ATS would not be justified in staying within domestic boundaries.  
 156. Id. at 404–05. 
 157. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 316, 367 (1943). 
 158. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719. 
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statutory torts, implied rights of action, and constitutional torts. Take, for 
example, how the Supreme Court approached the correct damages rule in 
admiralty law. It adopted the foreign proportional damages rule over the 
American rule of divided damages. It is important to recall that the pro-
portionate liability rule was adopted not because it was foreign, i.e., 
commanded by a sovereign who happened to be foreign, but because the 
Court felt that it was the best interpretation or expression of the global 
law of admiralty, taking into account the arguments for and against the 
rule preferred by American courts as well as foreign courts. The federal 
courts, by the same token, should be free to adopt “foreign” damages 
rules in the context of ATS litigation. For example, punitive damages are 
flatly prohibited in the tort law of all civil law nations and many common 
law nations.159 Following the logic of this Article to its conclusion, one 
might wonder why every court that has adjudicated ATS claims has as-
sumed that punitive damages ought to be available to a plaintiff who suc-
cessfully pleads and proves a tort in violation of the law of nations under 
the ATS.160 One might think, to the contrary, that the burden is on the 
judge who wishes to import a damages rule that is clearly disfavored 
among legal systems around the globe into the global law of redress that 
is authorized by the ATS once jurisdiction is satisfied. 
Once one understands that tort law in the ATS is global tort law, not 
the municipal tort law of the United States, then it becomes clear that 
judges and scholars have a great deal of work to do. The structure of the 
law of redress for wrongs—something that all civil and common law le-
gal systems possess—is diverse. The package of principles that has come 
to characterize the majority approach in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts is clearly not the only logical or sensible way to organize a tort sys-
tem. No one system should have a privileged position in the ATS. The 
principles adopted—whatever they are, and whomever they benefit—
should be chosen by federal courts on the basis of how well those princi-
ples fit the goals of the ATS, and not on the basis of whether they fit the 
                                                                                                             
 159. For a good review of the state of this doctrine globally, see John Y. Gotanda, 
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goals of the American Law Institute or the judges and legislators of any 
particular set of states. 
